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Abstract
The acute financial crisis that threatens the middle-income countries
and the chronic development crisis that grips most of the low-income
countries call for a radical reform of the Bretton Woods institutions.
This paper employs historical and institutional approaches in trying
to understand the sources of the failures and limitations of the
Bretton Woods institutions and suggests directions for reform and
change. After identifying the main driving forces behind their
historical evolution, the paper discusses reforming the institutional
practices and redefining the roles of the Bretton Woods institutions in
order to face the challenges of the two crises and offers some
thoughts on strategies for reform.
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1The Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, were created to bring
about orderly development of the world economy in the post-World War II era. The IMF
was to oversee the new international monetary system of adjustable peg linked to the
gold, and the World Bank to provide financing for reconstruction and development
projects. Over the course of the half a century’s history, their roles have undergone
drastic changes in response to the changes in the economic realities and the dominant
economic thinking. They have at the same time been key players in shaping the world
of today. Reforming the Bretton Woods institutions will be a critical part of any reform
of global economic governance as we enter the new millennium.
At the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton Woods conference, a
number of forums examined the Bretton Woods institutions and proposed various
reforms.1 However, it was only after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and its
repercussions in Russia in 1998 brought the world economy to the brink of a collapse
that a momentum for a serious reform of the Bretton Woods institutions was formed. It
was the devastation of the Great Depression and the disastrous breakdown of the
international monetary and trading system in the 1930s that led the world leaders to
create the Bretton Woods Institutions. The grossest failure of the “invisible hand”
nurtured the belief that stable economic growth requires active economic management
by the government in both the domestic and international spheres. In the wake of the
recent financial turmoil the world is once again debating a new "international financial
architecture”.2
                                                                
1 Prominent among these forums were the Bretton Woods Committee (Bretton Woods Commission, 1994),
the North-South Roundtable (ul Haq et al., 1995), the G-24 developing countries (Helleiner, 1996), the
Institute for International Economics (Kenen, 1994) and the Bretton Woods institutions themselves
(Boughton and Lateef, 1995).
2 See the articles in the Fall 1999 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the November 1999
issue of the Economic Journal , Ahluwalia (1999) and Sachs (1998). For official views, see Camdessus
(1998), IMF (1999a), UN (1999) and Hills et al. (1999).
2Devising a new and safer international financial architecture is not the only
major challenge to the Bretton Woods institutions. The capital flow volatility problem
concerns mainly a couple of dozen middle-income developing countries and transition
economies, the so-called emerging markets, although its potential threat to the entire
international financial system makes it indeed a grave problem. The persistent hunger
and poverty of two billion people around the world and the failure of development in
most of the poorest countries also pose a grave challenge to the Bretton Woods
institutions. Amidst cheers for the wonderfully efficient globalized markets, the poor in
the world have been losing ground further. More than half of the low-income economies
saw declining living standards and the disparities between the rich and poor countries
widened significantly over the pat few decades (World bank, 1999a). The Bretton
Woods institutions must see to it that the world economy provides opportunities for the
poor countries to step out of the poverty trap and start catching up with developed
countries.
The acute financial crisis that threatens the middle-income countries and the
chronic development crisis that grips most of the low-income countries call for a radical
reform of the Bretton Woods institutions. This paper is an attempt to suggest broad
directions of reform. It employs historical and institutional approaches in trying to
understand the sources of the failures and limitations of the Bretton Woods institutions.
A detailed blue print for reform would require much technical and analytical work on
specific issues. However, at this stage, it is more important to forge a consensus on the
direction of reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews
the evolution of the Bretton Woods institutions, identifying the main driving forces
behind the changes in their roles and functions. Section II discusses the institutional
3reform, including reform of governance and conditionality. Section III discusses how to
redefine the roles of the Bretton Woods institutions. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Evolution of the Bretton Woods Institutions
The Bretton Woods institutions were born in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference
where the major governments negotiated the institutional set-up for the postwar world
economic order. The Bretton Woods institutions have made continuous adaptations to
the changing economic circumstances and become quite different from what they were
at the beginning. The single most important factor in this process was the enormous
growth of capital markets with increasing mobility of capital across borders.
Original Design and the Golden Age
The Bretton Woods system consisted of three elements. The adjustable peg system was
introduced, in which the US dollar played a key role. The rates of other currencies
would be pegged to the dollar that would maintain a fixed parity to the gold with
infrequent changes in the pegged rates. Capital controls that had been introduced during
the wartime were allowed to remain in place in order to prevent the kind of disruptive
capital flows that were seen in the inter-war years. The IMF was created to oversee this
new monetary system, armed with financial resources and powers of surveillance. The
exchange rates would be adjusted only with the approval of the IMF when “fundamental
disequilibria” occurred. In the case of temporary disequilibria, the IMF would provide
financing to support the member countries experiencing balance of payments difficulties
in order to allow balance of payments adjustments without resorting to excessively
deflationary policies or import restrictions. This monetary and financial arrangement
was supposed to provide the basis for a liberal trading system. The ITO that was to
4oversee the international trade did not materialize but was substituted for by the GATT.
While the IMF was designed to provide short-term balance of payments relief,
the IBRD was to provide longer-term funds for investment in productive endeavors. The
IBRD has grown into the World Bank Group by adding new affiliates: IFC in 1956,
IDA in 1960, ICSID in 1966 and MIGA in 1988. Although the World Bank was almost
an after-thought at the time of its creation, its importance has grown to match that of the
IMF. The Bank’s mission was to intermediate between the capital market and the
governments in need of financing for reconstruction and development projects. Backed
by the uncalled portion of its capital committed by the member governments, the Bank
can raise funds at very favorable rates on the capital market even though it lends to
countries that could not borrow on the market or borrow only at considerably higher
rates. IDA, created in 1960, provides concessional loans to poor developing countries
with funds obtained from grants made by rich capital-exporting member governments.
The quarter century following the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions
saw the greatest prosperity in human history around the world except in much of Africa
and parts of Asia and is deservedly dubbed the Golden Age. This period also coincides
with the period of the Bretton Woods monetary system that ended with the transition to
floating exchange rates among the major currencies in 1973. It would be wrong,
however, to ascribe the successes of the Golden Age mainly to the successful operation
of the Bretton Woods institutions.
At the conclusion of the Second World War, the conditions for rapid growth
through catching-up were prepared in terms of both the large technological gap between
the leader and the followers and the advanced social capabilities in many of the follower
countries (Abramovitz, 1986). To realize these potentials, domestic institutions for
capital accumulation and international institutions for financial stability and trade
5expansion were all that was needed. The social compromise between capital and labor
based on collective bargaining and the welfare state provided for the domestic
institutions, and the Bretton Woods institutions, aided by the hegemonic leadership of
the US and other institutions like the EPU, filled the needs for the international
institutions.3 The role of the Bretton Woods institutions was therefore only a part of
what made the Golden Age. Moreover, their relatively smooth operation itself owed a
great deal to the stability of the economic environment in that period (Eichengreen,
1992). With these qualifications, we should nonetheless note that they performed useful
roles in promoting financial stability and liberal trade among the advanced countries
and giving a chance to developing countries to latch on to the growing world economy.
One reason for the success of the Bretton Woods system was the institutional
flexibility as exhibited by, for example, the creation of such institutions as the Marshall
Plan and the European Payment Union that supplemented the functions of the Bretton
Woods institutions. After the European countries successfully achieved currency
convertibility with the help of the EPU, the IMF paid increasing attention to developing
countries in the 1960s. Another important innovation was the creation of SDRs in 1969
in response to the shortage of international liquidity. One of the inherent difficulties in
the Bretton Woods system, stemming from the asymmetry between the US dollar and
other currencies, was the conflict between adequate provision of international liquidity
and US balance of payments stability, known as the Triffin’s dilemma. Creation of
SDRs was a solution to this problem, but it was, owing to the disputes over their
distribution, “too little, too late” to prevent the eventual fall of the Bretton Woods
system.
The IBRD also shifted its attention from reconstruction to development. In
                                                                
3 See Marglin and Schor (1990) for an institutional analysis of the Golden Age.
61960 the IDA was established to provide concessional loans to poor countries with little
creditworthiness. It was a move to answer the needs of the newly independent countries
in Africa and elsewhere and, at the same time, a measure to counter the demands of the
developing countries for a soft-loan or grant agency under the auspices of the UN.
There was also an important shift in the activities of the World Bank. Initially, the
Bank’s assistance mainly funded infrastructure projects, with two thirds of it going to
electric power and transportation during the first two decades of the Bank operation, but
it began to diversify into social projects and funding for policy reforms.
Adaptations in the World of Increasing Capital Mobility
The relatively tranquil Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates with infrequent
adjustments gave way to much greater exchange rate variability as a result of the shift to
the floating rates system in 1973. The two Oil Shocks in the seventies shook the world
economy. They were followed by the Debt Crisis of the eighties, a lost decade for the
greater part of the developing world. In the nineties the world economy faced the
challenge of transforming the former socialist planned economies into capitalist market
economies. It was also severely tested by the volatility of capital flows that produced a
new form of financial crisis originating from the capital, rather than current, account.
Underlying much of this great turbulence was the increasingly free and
massive movements of capital. The demise of the Bretton Woods fixed-but-adjustable
rate system itself owes a great deal to this. The very success of the Bretton Woods
institutions meant that countries had become more integrated through increased trade
and capital flows as exchange restrictions and capital controls gave way to
convertibility and increasing capital mobility. While this helped to fuel international
trade and investment, it also became a force to unhinge the par value system. Under the
7par value system, since any hint of an impending devaluation would invite speculative
attacks, governments found it impossible to make low-key adjustments in exchange
rates as changes in economic fundamentals necessitated them. Devaluations were
therefore made only in conditions of crisis and at a severe political cost. The gradual
liberalization of capital movements accentuated these difficulties. That is, the increasing
capital mobility compounded the difficulty of balancing flexibility and commitment
inherent in the fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate system and eventually led to its
breakdown.
The Debt Crisis originated from the recycling of oil-dollars in the aftermath of
the First Oil Shock, although it was triggered by the steep rise in the interest rates and
the ensuing world recession of the early 1980s. The commercial bank-centered
recycling of oil-dollars was dragging many developing countries into excessive
indebtedness, creating systemic risks. The IMF failed to recognize the risks of and
intervene in this process. Even after the outbreak of the Debt Crisis, its response was
slow, weak and inadequate, and the resolution of the crisis had to wait until the Brady
Plan of 1989, an initiative of the US Treasury. Similar failures were repeated in the
1990s. The Fund failed to recognize the growing risks in the large capital inflows into
Mexico before its 1994-95 crisis or those into Asian countries before their 1997-98
crisis.
The shift from the par value system to floating exchange rates seemed to
relinquish the Fund’s roles as the guarantor of exchange-rate stability and regulator of
international liquidity. The Fund responded to this situation by intensifying its
‘surveillance’ role to monitor the domestic policies. The argument was that, since the
exchange rate was going to be determined in the market, the IMF needed to monitor not
only the exchange rate policy but also the domestic fiscal and monetary policies that
8affect the exchange rate. But the IMF surveillance proved to be an inadequate means of
securing exchange rate stability. The experience of the floating rate system has been
characterized by excessive volatility in the seventies under the managed floating and
large misalignments in the eighties when the US and the Japanese governments took a
more liberal attitude towards exchange rates. Liberalization of capital accounts led to
rapid increases in gross capital flows, making exchange rates more susceptible to
changes in sentiment and short-term movements of capital than changes in economic
fundamentals.
While it was becoming clear that an effective coordination of the
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies of the major industrial countries was
necessary, the IMF shied away from taking an active role in this area, leaving the task of
policy coordination to the squabbling G7 governments.4 The IMF surveillance became
instead confined to the role of “limiting the likelihood and severity of difficulties calling
for [its] support” (Masson and Mussa, 1997) with doubtful performance. The IMF’s
uneasiness in dealing with the exchange-rate issue is reflected in its country programs,
too. Its recommendation has been wavering between fixed rate and floating rate.
Contrary to what its name and mandate suggest, the IMF remained less concerned about
the exchange rate policy than fiscal policy and inflation.
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the Fund and the Bank
have evolved into agents of structural reforms in debt-ridden developing countries with
loans as an inducement and conditionality as a weapon. The shift to floating exchange
rates and the growth of capital markets made the Fund irrelevant as a source of finance
to developed countries and concentrate on developing and, later, transition countries.
                                                                
4 The Bretton Woods Commission (1994) has suggested that the IMF take over the responsibility of
policy coordination from the G7 countries in order to reduce exchange rate volatility and misalignments,
9The Fund was thus moving closer to development financing with creation of the new
longer-term loan facilities such as Extended Fund Facility in 1974 and Structural
Adjustment Facility in 1986. In doing so, the Fund embarked on structural reforms of
the borrowing countries, stretching its mandate by arguing that such reforms would
strengthen the countries’ prospects for growth and thereby reduce exchange rate
instability and the need for IMF assistance. While this shift started as a response to the
First Oil Crisis and the ensuing balance-of-payments difficulties in many oil-importing
countries, the full-blown focus on structural reforms began after the Debt Crisis of the
1980s. This move has led to widening scope for loan conditions. As the chief architect
of the adjustment programs, the Fund now incorporated a whole range of structural
reforms in its programs.
The Bank, on the other hand, began to give loans for balance-of-payments
support as many developing countries experienced severe macroeconomic imbalances
and accumulation of external debts after the oil crises. The Bank introduced structural
adjustment lending in 1979, but it was in the early 1980s that the Bank earnestly
launched its program of structural reforms to eliminate structural rigidities and improve
incentives in an effort to tackle the deepening economic problems of developing
countries.5 The structural adjustment lending differed from the past lending modalities
in its focus on balance-of-payments problems rather than specific projects or sector
reforms and its introduction of explicit and detailed conditionalities and greater
commitment to enforce them (Kapur, 1997).
With the Fund moving closer to development financing and structural reform
and the Bank increasing its role for balance-of-payment support and policy reform, the
                                                                                                                                                                                             
and eventually to a system of flexible exchange rate bands.
5 Adjustment lending rapidly increased and accounted for about a quarter of the total Bank lending in the
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two Bretton Woods institutions came to have a greater overlap in their activities
(Ahluwalia, 1999). At the same time the views of the two institutions converged greatly,
producing the so-called “Washington Consensus” that underpinned their operations in
developing and transition economies in the 1980s and 1990s.
Washington Consensus
The Washington Consensus refers to an approach to development born out of the
integration of the traditional IMF concerns for macroeconomic stability (anti-inflation,
anti-deficit policies) and the Bank agenda of efficiency enhancing reforms (openness,
competition, deregulation, privatization). A typical package of IMF stabilization and
World Bank adjustment include: fiscal and monetary austerity, devaluation, trade
liberalization, financial liberalization and banking system restructuring, price
liberalization, privatization, labor market deregulation, tax reform and subsidy cuts
(Williamson, 1990).
The birth of the Washington Consensus reflected a shift in the ideological
currents toward neo-liberalism, which emerged out of the erosion of the Golden Age.
The Golden Age growth regime was based on a compromise on domestic distribution
and the Keynesian management of domestic demand and international liquidity. What
was responsible for the demise of the Golden Age is debatable, but problems arose in
both areas (Marglin, 1990; Schor and You, 1995). Renewed capital-labor conflict and
mounting difficulties in the monetary system since the late 1960s, in addition to such
exogenous disturbances as the oil shocks, led to a profit squeeze, productivity
slowdown and rising inflation in the 1970s. Neo-liberalism emerged in this context as
an offensive from the capital that aimed at striking down the deal with the labor and
                                                                                                                                                                                             
second half of the 1980s.
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reducing the role of the state in economic management. The rise to power of the
conservative governments of Thatcher and Reagan at the beginning of the 1980s
ushered in an era of neo-liberalism.
Along with this ideological shift toward neo-liberalism, Keynesianism and
structuralism were discredited in the economics profession. These changes in the
dominant thinking formed the background for the rise of the Washington Consensus.
While many of the policies in the Washington Consensus package could be useful if
applied pragmatically, they were typically implemented with an excessive zeal to
achieve what the textbook says it should be and without due consideration to the
institutional and political factors. As a result, they often created unexpected problems
and strains such as demand overkill, financial instability, increased corruption and
deterioration in income distribution (Taylor, 1997). These problems have been
particularly acute in the case of the transition economies where reforms have been over-
loaded.
This is not a place for a comprehensive evaluation of the Fund-Bank structural
adjustment programs. Suffice it to note that most studies, including the ones by the staff
of the Bretton Woods institutions, find no systematic effects on growth, inflation and
income distribution, although individual country episodes of disasters and successes are
plenty. 6 They tend to find only a moderate improvement in the balance of payments but
at the cost of a decline in aggregate investment. If the assistance from the Bretton
Woods institutions result in little improvement in economic performance, it must be
taken as a failure.
The problems of the Washington Consensus may be summarized as follows.
                                                                
6 See Schadler et al. (1995) and Fischer (1997) for views of the IMF staff. Killick (1995a) contains a
review of many studies. His own conclusion is that the adjustment programs have “rather limited revealed
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The growth-oriented critique takes issue with the short-term orientation of the
adjustment programs. With compression of aggregate demand as a preferred means of
adjustment, the adjustment programs were accused of giving little attention to
improving growth prospects and often positively damaging growth prospects by
implementing cuts in public investment (Taylor, 1988). The equity-oriented critique
points to the adverse effects on poverty and income distribution of the adjustment
programs. Indeed, such adverse effects were found in most Latin American and African
countries, although not in Asian countries (Stewart, 1995). The sustainability-oriented
critique criticizes not only the insensitivity of the Bretton Woods institutions on the
environmental impact of their programs. It also criticized their single-minded pursuit of
liberalization policies on the ground that “Illiberal policies which do not damage overall
macro stability are preferable to liberal policies which are inherently unsustainable or
endanger macro instability” (Rodrik, 1990, p.933).7 On a more specific level, the drive
to financial and capital account liberalization in developing and transition economies
has proven to be highly dangerous.
Two Neo-Liberal Crises
All the structural reforms and liberalization measures a la Washington
Consensus could not prevent a general slowdown of growth after the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system in most parts of world, with sub-Saharan Africa and the former
                                                                                                                                                                                             
effects on developing country economies (p.157).”
7 These critiques are encapsulated in a report by the Group of Twenty Four (G-24, 1987, p.9): “The
experience of developing countries that have undertaken Fund supported adjustment programs has not
generally been satisfactory.  The Fund approach to adjustment has had severe economic costs for many
of these countries in terms of declines in the levels of output and growth rates, reductions in employment
and adverse effects on income distribution.  A typical Fund program prescribes measures that require
excessive compression of domestic demand, cuts in real wages, and reductions in government
expenditures; these are frequently accompanied by sharp exchange rate depreciation and import
liberalization measures, without due regard to their potentially disruptive effects on the domestic
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Soviet Union experiencing disastrous falls in standards of living. East Asia was the
glaring exception, but the region has just gone through a serious setback following the
financial crisis. The world economy in the era of neo-liberalism has exhibited two kinds
of crises: an acute financial crisis that has hit many emerging-market economies and a
chronic development crisis that has gripped much of the poor developing world.
The incredible rise in the mobility of capital, with about two trillion dollars
crossing borders everyday these days of which eighty percent is purely speculative, has
become a major threat to economic stability. Indeed, the 1990s witnessed a series of
major crises - Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999 -
which shared a central feature that the problems originated in the capital account unlike
the earlier payments crises that arose in the current account (Ahluwalia, 1999). After
premature and hasty liberalization of capital movements developing and transition
economies became highly vulnerable to periods of rapid expansion of capital flows and
their abrupt reversals – a problem aggravated by fragile domestic financial structures
and weak financial regulation and supervision. Capital account liberalization, by
exposing the country to the webs and flows of capital that is dependent on the judgment
and sentiment of international bankers and fund managers, turned a whole range of
economic and social policies into a beauty contest. Losers in this contest, which may
not necessarily be fair owing to imperfections in the flow of information, suffer crises of
confidence. Such crises are also highly contagious, increasing systemic risks of the
global financial system.
Having helped create the financial crises by urging capital account
liberalization in developing and transition economies, the Fund took on the role of
firefighters, enlisting the Bank for a supporting role. The quick recoveries of Mexico
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and Asia are taken by some as a vindication of the Fund’s role in crisis management.
However, the quick recoveries may have simply been a consequence of the fact that the
crises were mainly panic-driven. In fact, the patent failure of the Fund’s initial rescue
operations in the wake the Asian Financial Crisis underscored the fact that it was ill
equipped to deal with this new form of crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). Faced with a
sudden and large reversal of capital flows, what the crisis-stricken countries needed was
a large up-front funding or a swift debt rescheduling rather than the high-conditionality
phased funding. Crisis-stricken Asian countries began to stabilize only after
rescheduling of debt and started to recover only after relaxation of the belt-tightening
measures initially imposed by the Fund. The recent financial crises have necessitated a
fundamental rethinking on the global financial system and the role of the IMF.
While the Fund must redefine its roles so as to meet the challenges of the new
financial reality, with its primary focus on prevention and management of acute
financial crises in emerging market economies, the Bank’s challenge is to confront the
other crisis of the neo-liberal era, the chronic development crisis. Amidst cheers for the
wonderfully efficient globalized markets, the poorest countries have fared badly.
Between 1980-97, per capital private consumption fell in 20 and stagnated in 2 out of
the 37 low-income economies for which the date are available.8 In contrast, it fell in
only 13 out of 40 middle-income economies and in none of the 21 high-income
economies. Regionally, Sub-Saharan Africa suffered the most, with 22 out of 33
countries recording a negative or zero growth in per capita consumption. Many of them
saw disastrous declines in living standards.
The poor economic performance of the poorest countries naturally meant
                                                                
8 See Table 2, p. 232 for growth of per capita private consumption and p. 290 for classification of
economies by income and region in World Bank (1999a).
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increasing disparity between the rich and poor nations. Over the quarter century
between 1970 and 1995, average per capita GDP of the poorest third of all countries
dropped from 3.1 to 1.9 percent of the richest third – a relative income decline of 39
percent (World Bank, 1999a). The consequence is grotesque: Globally, the 20 percent of
the world’s people in the poorest-income countries account for a minuscule 1.3 percent
of total private consumption expenditures (UNDP, 1998). These are the people under
such abject poverty that their calorie intake is insufficient to support an active body.
Many of the countries under the grip of the development crisis have followed
the neo-liberal prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. At the same time, China and
India among the low-income economies and the East Asian countries among the
middle-income economies have been able to register spectacular successes in
development by diverging in important ways from the standard prescriptions. The Bank
must recognize its past failures and find new and more effective ways to address the
persistent poverty of two billion people and the chronic development crisis in the
poorest countries.
II. Institutional Reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions
The importance of institutional reform of the Bretton Woods institutions cannot be
overemphasized. Since they are monopolists or near-monopolists, they cannot be
disciplined by external competition or the ‘exit’ option (Stiglitz, 1999). The alternative,
the ‘voice’ mechanism, has not worked well because of poor governance in terms of
representation and participation, accountability and transparency. Many flaws and
failures have persisted as a result, including the practice of conditionality. Despite being
intrinsically objectionable and practically ineffective, conditionality has continuously
proliferated and grown increasingly intrusive.
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Governance in the Bretton Woods Institutions
A defining characteristic of the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions is that the
major shareholders, the rich industrial countries, control decision-making and that the
borrowing countries have little say. While, formally, the Bretton Woods institutions are
cooperative institutions voluntarily joined and owned by member countries, real
ownership belongs to the select powerful countries. This is ensured by the quota-based
voting system. 9 In order to maintain their identities as universal and public organizations
the Bretton Woods institutions did allocate a certain share of votes, namely the basic
votes, equally to all members, but never to such an extent as to threaten the control of
the major shareholders. In fact, the proportion of the basic votes has been dramatically
eroded, from the peak of 14 percent in 1955 at the Fund to around 3 percent at both the
Fund and the Bank, in order to ensure that wealthy countries remain in control even
after the decolonization process led to increasing, and eventually almost universal,
membership at the Bretton Woods institutions (Woods, 1998).
The quota-based voting system meant that the perspectives and the interests of
the rich capital-exporting countries pervaded the Bretton Woods institutions. Combined
with the plain fact that hardly any country would commit large amounts of resources for
international purposes without trying to advance its own power and interests, it
produced some important problems in the institutions.
First, there has been a tendency to advocate financial restraint over Keynesian
expansion, particularly in the Fund. Reflecting the dominant economic thinking and the
political currents of the time, there was definitely a Keynesian, social democratic and
                                                                
9 The quotas are supposed to reflect the relative economic strength of the member countries, but quota
adjustments are highly political and do not reflect a coherent principle.
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internationalist spirit in the original design of the Bretton Woods institutions.10 But,
compared to the ideas contained in the Clearing Union proposal by Keynes himself, the
IMF came to be decidedly less Keynesian (Singer, 1995). As a result, the Fund
programs have been perennially accused of a bias toward demand overkill – an ironic
situation given that the very rationale of the IMF loans is to avoid unnecessarily
deflationary adjustments. It is only natural that lenders have a bias toward financial
conservatism, as it is natural that borrowers may be inclined toward financial
irresponsibility. Initially, it was the capital-exporting US that killed the more
expansionary British Plan and the commodity price stabilization scheme. It was the US
that insisted on introduction of conditionality over European objections. But when the
European countries became donors, their position on loan conditionality and financial
discipline of borrowing countries became just like the position of the US. German and
Japanese reluctance to expand their economies in the 1980s also points to inherent
difficulties of international Keynesianism without political integration.
Second, there have been too many politically-motivated loan decisions as a
result of undue influences from the large shareholders. The dominance of the US, the
largest shareholder, meant frequent injection of the US politics and foreign policy into
the loan decisions of the Bretton Woods institutions in violation of the political
neutrality principle.11 But the US was not alone in attempting to use loans to advance
own economic interests and political objectives. In what is perhaps the most egregious
                                                                
10 The purpose of the IMF as set out in Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement includes “the promotion
and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income” and “providing opportunity to correct
maladjustments in [the] balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or
international prosperity” in addition to international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, expansion
of trade and convertibility.
11 Examples of how the IMF and the Bank were used to promote the US foreign policy agenda include,
among others, the rejection of the loans to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1949, cessation of lending to
Chile during the Allende years and to Vietnam and Afgahanistan in 1979, and support for Turkey in the
mid-1950s and El Salvador in the 1980s over European objections (Payer, 1982).
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lending in the history of the IMF, the lending to Russia, the EU has been at least as
responsible as the US. Other notable examples include the role of France in
Francophone Africa and Japan in Asia in pressing the Bretton Woods institutions to lend
in a manner that bolsters their interests.
Third, the exclusion of the borrowing countries from decision-making
provided the institutional conditions for the proliferation of increasingly intrusive
conditionality and the lack of ownership in adjustment programs. Greater participation
by the countries that are directly and heavily affected by their decisions would have
ameliorated the situation. It must be added that participation is not entirely a matter of
formal governance structure. Notable exceptions notwithstanding, the representatives of
the borrowing countries were often more interested in enjoying their stays in
Washington than articulating their views at the executive meetings.
Flaws in the governance of the Bretton Woods institutions appear also in the
lack of accountability and transparency in their operations. Even in formal set-up, they
are accountable to finance ministers of member countries who are not necessarily
unbiased representatives of the people (Stiglitz, 1999). In practice, such accountability
means little. The risks of the IMF programs have been disproportionately borne by the
borrowing countries and little by the IMF or its major shareholders (Kapur, 1997). The
situation with the Bank is no different. Huge controversies arose over various Bank-
financed projects that resulted in poor performance or destruction of indigenous
people’s livelihoods and the environment, with little responsibility borne by the Bank.12
It even objected to the introduction of independent evaluations on the projects before
                                                                
12 Some of the notorious projects include the Sardar Sarovar dam project in India, the Polonoroeste
Frontier Development Scheme in Brazil and the Pak Mun dam project in Thailand. While the Bank
policies recommend adequate compensation for the people forcibly displaced by its projects, a Bank
review could not find a single example of a Bank-financed resettlement plan in Latin America or Africa
where the Bank’s guidelines had been properly implemented (World Bank, 1994).
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being forced to do so by the pressure from the US Congress (van de Laar, 1980). The
Fund acquiesced to external evaluations only recently.
Accountability suffers when information on the decisions and operations of
institutions are not subject to public scrutiny. While both the Fund and the Bank publish
information on their operations in copious volumes, the public do not have access to the
most sensitive information regarding who made what decisions based on what criteria.
Tens of billions of dollars have been committed based on secret phone calls between the
Managing Director of the Fund and the finance ministers of a few key countries. The
Bretton Woods institutions are rightly accused of preaching without practic ing
transparency (Sachs, 1997).
The lack of transparency and accountability has allowed the tendency for
expansion of programs and objectives. As economic conditions and policy objectives
evolve, new programs have been added but without clearly redefining the roles and
refocusing the programs. Even more seriously, it has allowed prolongation of failed
practices and flawed doctrines as shown in the persistent practice of conditionality and
the continuing influence of the Washington Consensus.
Conditionality
Conditionality did not exist in the original IMF Articles of Agreement due to the
European opposition. 13 The Fund was in fact considered “a sort of automatic machine
selling foreign exchange to members within certain limits and on certain terms” as the
Managing Director Gutt put it in a 1946 statement to the Executive Board (Dell, 1981).
                                                                
13 See Dell (1981) for a review of the early debates on conditionality. He finds that “The Europeans had
the best of argument, perhaps, but it was the United States that had the resources and it was the resources
that counted.” (p. 8).
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The Fund began to apply conditionality in 1952.14 With the successive introduction of
stand-by agreements, phasing and binding performance criteria over the 1950s,
conditionality was steadily becoming more onerous. As the Fund shifted its focus
toward structural reform in the 1970s, proliferation of conditionality took a new turn;
the number of performance criteria per program increased by 50 percent during the
1970s and the 1980s (Killick, 1995a).
The World Bank followed the IMF leads in this. While its loans always had
project-level conditionality in the form of loan covenants, it was since the introduction
of structural adjustment lending that conditionality became highly formal, explicit and
detailed. As the Bank devoted increasing amount of its resources to structural
adjustment lending, the scope of the loan conditions also expanded steadily. From the
initial focus on fiscal and trade policies and price liberalization, increasing emphasis
was given to privatization and deregulation, and public and financial sector reforms. In
addition to these purely economic conditionalities, the Bank’s agenda expanded further
in the nineties to include environment, governance and public expenditures (Kapur,
1997). Proliferation of conditionalities and interference with domestic politics
inevitably followed. For instance, the average number of Bank conditions per
adjustment loan increased from 39 for 1980-88 to 56 for 1989-1991 (Killick, 1995b).
The proliferation of conditionality occurred, it would be hard to deny, as
developing countries came to replace the European countries as the principal borrowers.
Initially, the European abhorrence of interference with domestic policies prevented the
inclusion of conditionality in the Articles of Agreement of the Fund.15 Even when
                                                                
14 Introduced initially as a matter of a Board policy decision, it was not until 1969 that the principle of
conditionality was given explicit legal sanction through amendment of the Articles of Agreement.
15 The intrusions by the staff of the Bretton Woods institutions in the economic affairs of their members
“would have surprised the American delegation to Bretton Woods and would probably have infuriated the
British, who regarded national economic sovereignty as an absolute, whatever might be agreed about
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conditionality was firmly in place and greatly expanded, a large standby arrangement
for the United Kingdom was approved in 1967 with a minimum of conditions. This
provoked a concern among developing country Executive Directors as to equal
treatment, and it was found that the number of performance criteria in loans for Latin
American and Asian members had been on average far greater than for European
members (Dell, 1981).
As the European countries stopped borrowing from the Fund and the Bank,
their objections to conditionality evaporated. Freed from the European objections, the
Bretton Woods institutions developed highly intrusive programs as they focused on
structural adjustment and reform in developing countries. They came to see themselves
a catalyst for change rather than merely financial institutions. Their experience with
structural reform during the debt crisis was put to use in the 1990s after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the liberation of its former Easter European satellites. Entrusted
by the G7, the Bretton Woods institutions became the director of the transition
experiment, implementing far-reaching stabilization and reform measures. And they
attempted to do a similar transformation exercise in Asia in responding to the Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997, trying to convert the non-orthodox market economies into
orthodox ones. This provoked Feldstein (1998, p.27) to ask, “If the policies to be
changed are also practiced in the major industrial economies of Europe, would the IMF
think it appropriate to force similar changes in those countries if they were subject to a
fund program?”
On a conceptual level, we can identify four separate problems of conditionality.
First, there is a problem of the content of conditionality. Many critics have objected to
the monetarist aspect and the neo-liberal zeal that conditionality frequently embodies.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
plans for a Fund and a Bank” (Oliver, 1985, p.41).
22
Moreover, the so-called “one size fits all” approach of the Bretton Woods institutions in
designing and implementing the programs has often meant that country-specific
circumstances, both economic and socio-political, are neglected.
Second, conditionality has become an infringement on national sovereignty as
it has expanded into areas that have no direct bearing on repayment of loans to include
wide-ranging structural reform issues (Collier and Gunning, 1999). And the recent
tendency for the donor governments, in response to pressures from single-issue NGOs,
to impose non-economic conditions on human rights, social policy and environment is
finding ways into the Bretton Woods institutions. No matter how desirable the changes
sought by these conditions may be, they should not be forced upon governments on
their knees by the international financial institutions.
Third, conditionality subverts democratic political process when it goes beyond
the macroeconomic adjustment essential for restoring balance of payments (Stiglitz,
1999). In the name of efficiency and good economics, the Bretton Woods institutions
have developed a habit of imposing policies that should properly be decided by
domestic politics, for instance independence of the central bank or labor market rules,
on more or less reluctant governments desperate for money. “This process …  has
undermined political legitimacy in dozens of developing countries, especially since the
IMF is often happy to conspire with governments to make end runs around parliaments
in the interests of “reform.” ... [We should aim] to restore legitimacy to local politics,
and abandon the misguided belief that the IMF and World Bank can micro-manage the
process of economic reform” (Sachs, 1998).
Fourth, conditionality has been ineffective in changing the policies of the
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recipient governments, not to mention improving economic performance.16 Externally
imposed conditionality undermines local ‘ownership’ - the extent to which the
borrowing government regards the program as its own. It also invites lack of
commitment to carry out programs, undermines the legitimacy of programs and
strengthens opposition to reform. It can even drive reform-minded governments to
oppose reform in order to maximize the price at which reform can be sold (Gilbert et al.,
1999). Proliferation of conditionality has thus produced high incidence of non-
compliance in both the Fund and the Bank programs. The non-compliance problem in
turn has produced a phenomenon of “paper conditionality”: programs that all parties
recognize will not be implemented and that merely satisfies the need to keep the money
moving (Martin, 1991). All these incentive problems conspire to render conditionality
highly ineffective.
Directions for Institutional Reform
It is critical that the Bretton Woods institutions must, in order to continue to be the
central institutions for governing the global economy, reform its governance and mode
of operation. First, they must devise ways in which developing country concerns can be
better represented as a shared sense of stewardship is needed more than ever.
Transforming the Interim Committee and the Development Committee, currently a
ceremonial advisory body, into a decision-making body with better representation of the
developing and transition countries would be such an option. 17 At the same time, the
                                                                
16 See Mosley et al. (1995). An indirect evidence on the ineffectiveness of conditionality is provided by
the Bank staffs, who show that Bank supervision had no significant effect on success after controlling for
political economy variables (Dollar and Svensson, 1997).
17 I am persuaded by the view of Ahluwalia (1999) on this issue. At the annual meeting of 1999, the IMF
Board of governors approved transformation of the Interim Committee into the International Monetary
and Financial Committee. In addition to the name change, more substantive discussions are expected as
there is now an explicit provision for preparatory meetings. But there is no change in the composition of
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voting system must be reformed toward a greater representation by developing countries.
This is not to suggest that equal vote for countries of different sizes and capabilities is
desirable, because it would not only be unworkable due to the unwillingness of the
powerful countries to participate but also imply a highly unequal representation among
peoples. Some combination of quota-based votes and basic votes seems a reasonable
solution. Although it is precisely the practiced of the Bretton Woods institutions, the
share of the basic votes is so minimal that the basic votes have little significance.
Perhaps, something like a double-majority rule – requiring a majority based on quotas
and a majority based on basic votes – is needed.18
Second, transparency and accountability need be strengthened. While there
have recently been steps toward releasing more information and receiving external
evaluations, they fall far short of what is needed. External evaluation of individual
programs must be strengthened, with representatives of the program countries included
in the evaluation teams, and the staff in charge must be held accountable to failed
programs. Relevant information should be released as much as possible. And the
practice of consensus decision that helps to keep the real decision-making, negotiating
and arm-twisting processes behind the scenes should be ended in favor of decision-
making by open discussion and voting (Woods, 1998).
Third, the practice of conditionality should be fundamentally reformed. As a
remedy to the ineffectiveness of conditionality, some have argued for simpler
conditionality with stronger punishments on renegers (Mosley et al., 1995; Hills et al.,
1999). Another idea is to have adjustment programs designed by the recipient
government in order to strengthen ownership. A more drastic reform proposal is to
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the committee members or in its status as an advisory body.
18 See Woods (1998) for a good discussion on this issue.
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make conditionality ex post - that is, to direct loans to only those countries that have
good policies in place and simply do away with conditionality (Gilbert et al., 1999).
These reform ideas are not free from objections. Simpler conditionality may
reduce but not eliminate ownership/incentive problems. The Fund loans to support
balance of payments may take this approach, but with automatic modification in case
demand compression exceeds target. Having programs prepared by the recipient
governments first would work only if the governments are serious about reform and the
Bretton Woods institutions are prepared to accept them with minimal input of their own.
Otherwise, it would simply be a cosmetic change. Therefore, this idea may be best put
into practice in conjunction with the ex post conditionality. As far as ‘good-policy’
countries are concerned, it makes eminent sense to have automatic approval of the
program prepared by the recipient country and thereby get rid of conditionality as we
know it. The problem here is what criteria to use in judging if a country is a ‘good-
policy’ or a ‘poor policy’ one. However indirect, these criteria could still cause
infringement on sovereignty and subversion of democratic political process. In order to
minimize this problem, they need to be confined to a small set of macroeconomic
performance measures.
Another problem with the ex post conditionality is that it will direct resources
away from the ‘poor policy’ countries, which are often the most needy. These countries
have been coming back to the Fund one program after another, producing a tendency for
the Fund to have programs in an enduring set of developing countries (Bird, 1996).
There is no point in continuing to keep them in the debt trap. The Fund should get out of
these countries by simply forgiving their debts and leave the task to the Bank. The Bank
should not simply sustain but increase aid to them, but in a totally different manner as
discussed in the next section.
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Fourth, decision-making and research activities of the Bretton Woods
institutions that are now concentrated in their Washington headquarters should be
decentralized as much as possible. Without such a move, it will be difficult to achieve
true ownership and involvement of the affected people and devise policies that are fully
considerate of the special local conditions. More research and decision-making at the
local offices is a necessary condition for enhancing ownership, the importance of which
the Bank now fully acknowledges.19 Rhetorical change aside, however, there is little
change in ground operations. They may now hold meetings with local NGOs and labor
unions, but these are more cosmetic touches than serious consensus building.
Decentralization of research in the Bretton Woods institutions would also be an
effective way of injecting a greater dose of pragmatism into their programs and greater
diversity in their intellectual and political perspectives into the institutional thinking.
Because of the screening effect of the hiring process and the later socialization effect the
staff community in Washington is apt to develop a more or less homogeneous outlook
and take doctrinaire positions without much regard to specificities of local contexts.
This has to change. The staff size of the Washington headquarters should be radically
cut down, and much more research projects should be carried out within the recipient
countries. This would also enable substantial increases in hiring of local economists
who are knowledgeable about the specific local conditions and the subtle political
implications. At the same time, it will help build up local capacity in policy research.
                                                                
19 A report by its Evaluations Department found a highly significant relationship between borrower
ownership and program success (Johnston and Wasty, 1993). The IMF was more reluctant to
acknowledge the importance of this issue, but has recently come around to advocate greater ownership.
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III. Redefining the Roles of the Bretton Woods Institutions
The volatility of capital flows and the highly contagious nature of the recent financial
crises show that the current international financial system is unable to safeguard the
world economy and that we need a new and safer international financial architecture. At
the same time the chronic development crisis calls for a major rethinking on how to help
accelerate growth in poor countries of the world. These challenges provide the context
in which we must redefine the roles of the Bretton Woods institutions.
New International Financial Architecture and the Fund
The recent crises provoked impassioned calls for a fundamental reform of the global
financial governance.20 As a UN report put it, there is an “enormous discrepancy that
exists between an increasingly sophisticated and dynamic international financial world,
with rapid globalization of financial portfolios, and the lack of a proper institutional
framework to regulate it” (UN, 1999). However, this state of affairs has not come about
all of a sudden. As we saw in the historical review, the Fund has been increasingly
marginalized in managing capital flows and exchange rates even as they become more
and more volatile. Instead, the Fund has been drawn into clearing up the financial mess
left behind by the volatile capital flows. Many of the proposals for strengthening the
international financial architecture concern what individual countries, both the recipient
and the originating countries, should do or creation of new international institutions.
                                                                
20 There emerged a shared sense of crisis and a broad agreement on the need for serious reforms in the
summer of 1998, when the crisis-stricken East Asia was plunging into the depths of recession and,
particularly after the Russian crisis, the contagion effect was threatening a global deflation. However, the
Bretton Woods institutions and G-7 are once again retreating into complacency and business as usual. The
1999 Bank-Fund Annual Meeting was a big disappointment. The dominant feeling was that the crisis has
passed, that lessons have been learned and that more intelligent ad hoc action is a better bet than grand
systemic reforms.
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However worthy they may be, it is of central importance that the Fund play constructive
roles in stabilizing global finance through crisis prevention, not just crisis management.
First, the Fund, along with the Bank, should help strengthen the financial
systems of individual countries. It is beyond dispute that national financial systems must
be strengthened by such measures as greater transparency, better regulation and
supervision, and improved corporate governance and bankruptcy laws.21 There are two
caveats, however. For one, it would be difficult and probably unwise to apply universal
global standards, given the diversity of the economic conditions and institutional history.
Emphasis should be on helping countries improve laws and regulations in order to
contain systemic risks and develop expertise to back them up rather than imposing
universal standards. For another, insofar as common minimum standards are advisable,
there are disagreements on what institution must take charge in setting and
implementing them. While many seem content with leaving the task to the Bretton
Woods institutions and other existing institutions like the Basle Committee and the
International Organization of Securities Commissions, some see the need to create a
global financial regulator (Eatwell and Taylor, 1998; Kaufman, 1998). In any case, the
Bretton Woods institutions are well positioned to play a constructive role with the
wealth of country experience they have accumulated.
Second, the Fund should change its position on capital account liberalization.
The Bretton Woods institutions were created at a time when capital controls were an
almost universal practice. While they played an instrumental role in promoting financial
market integration and free capital mobility, they have not prepared themselves to deal
                                                                
21 While this is commonly recognized as something that capital-recipient countries must do, it is also
important for capital-originating countries to take some measures in this area. Chief among them are
strengthening the regulation of highly-leveraged financial institutions and the introduction of “collective
action clauses” in their sovereign bond contracts so that developing countries could do the same without
being stigmatized in the market (Hills et al., 1999).
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with the problems of volatility and contagion. Therefore, it is vital that developing and
transition economies retain autonomy in managing the capital account unless the
international financial system is radically improved. This consideration must be
incorporated into the discussions on broadening IMF mandates to include capital
account convertibility.
In fact, the Fund should go one step further and officially sanction and
encourage certain types of measures to curb excessive inflows of short-term capital in
developing and transition economies that suffer from weak financial supervision and
regulation (see, for instance, Hills et al., 1999). While the benefits of free capital flows
are yet to be established, it is clear that capital account liberalization has created huge
difficulties in macroeconomic management and acute vulnerabilities in financial
systems (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). The fact that China and India in Asia and Chile in
Latin America were able to avoid severe financial gyrations or sharp output contractions
during the recent regional crises should not be ignored.22 In a sense, capital controls,
particularly on the inflows, are a form of prudential policy operating at the macro level.
It seems illogical for those who advocate tightening prudential regulation on financial
institutions to be hostile toward any measures to control capital flows.
Third, the Fund should take charge of macroeconomic policy coordination and
exchange rate stabilization, instead of leaving the task to the G-7 (or G-3 after the
monetary unification in EU) in the interest of a more rational global demand
management. The currency fluctuations among G-3 can have serious repercussions to
the smaller economies, generating macroeconomic imbalances and financial instabilities.
                                                                
22 This is not to say that capital controls are without problems and costs. But they seem minor compared
to the big danger of free capital mobility. Opponents of capital controls point to the fact that Chile has
recently removed the taxes on capital inflows. But the rationale of the Chilean system is precisely to be
able to adjust the tax rates according to the economic conditions. Chile removed the taxes as the current
account went into deficit and consequently there was need to attract more foreign capital.
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Unfortunately, the Fund remains silent on the issue of exchange rate management,
offering further study as the only answer (IMF, 1999). As more and more developing
economies choose to float their currencies in thin exchange markets, the Fund should
pay greater attention exchange rate stability.
Fourth, the Fund should change its lending policy. The Fund should move
away from long-term lending and focus on its role as the global lender of last resort. It
must be noted that the Fund, together with G-7 governments, has already been playing
the role of the lender of last resort by providing emergency rescue financing to countries
facing liquidity crises. Recently, the Fund has created new facilities - the Supplemental
Reserve Facility and the Contingent Credit Line – in order to strengthen this role.
However, even after it increased its resources through the New Arrangements to Borrow
in 1998 and the increase in quota in 1999, they are far from being sufficient to counter
major swings in capital flows.23 The reliance on supplementary funds from G-7
governments has at times resulted in insertion of absurd loan conditions.24 In order to
enable the Fund to be a true global lender of last resort, it would have to be empowered
to issue SDRs to itself subject to a limit, which would be extinguished upon repurchase
by the borrowing country (UN, 1999). This move would relieve the Fund of the
resource shortage problem and excessive pressures from contributing governments.
Making the Fund a true global lender of last resort will mean greater powers
and resources for the Fund, and understandably it favors this role (Fischer, 1999a).
However, we should not let the financial bureaucrats of the Fund wield even greater
                                                                
23 The total amount of resources available to the Fund under the NAB and the General Arrangements to
Borrow rose to SDR 34 billion, double the amount under the GAB alone. And the quota increase of 1999
raised overall quotas from SDR 146 billion to SDR 212 billion, vastly improving the Fund’s liquidity
position (IMF, 1999b).
24 A blatant example of this occurred when the Japanese government successfully insisted on including
removal of the import diversification policy – restrictions on importation of certain Japanese
manufactured products – in the letter of intent for the Korea loan of 1997.
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powers than now over crisis economies and emasculate local political systems. For this
purpose, a set of criteria must be developed so that last resort financing would be
available without any conditionality but at penalty interest rates only when a crisis is
clearly driven by panic or contagion. In other payment crises in ‘good policy’ countries,
conditionality must be confined to the minimum macroeconomic adjustments for the
purpose of balance-of-payments improvement subject to automatic modification in case
demand compression exceeds the target. For ‘poor policy’ countries, the Fund should
not lend.25
Finally, the Fund must develop a program for ‘bailing-in’ - involving the
private sector more fully in forestalling and resolving crises (Fischer, 1999b).
Strengthening the Fund’s role as the lender of last resort raises concern on moral hazard
in international lending. For the borrowing countries, the problem can be minimized by
linking the availability and the borrowing cost of the emergency rescue finance to their
crisis prevention efforts. But the problem may become serious with respect to the
creditors who will be tempted to downplay the risks of lending to developing and
transition economies if their careless lending gets bailed out again and again. This is
morally and politically unacceptable in addition to being economically inefficient.
Bailing-in could take a few alternative forms. One that the Fund encourages is
utilization of market-based incentives and instruments for the private sector to remain
involved such as private contingency credit lines a la Argentine. This is a useful device,
but it is a costly defense similar to building up large reserves. The Fund could provide
guarantees and thereby reduce the cost of making such arrangements. Another method
that has been used, for instance in the framework of the Paris Club or more recently in
                                                                
25 A possible objection to this is that when strategically important countries that do not qualify as “good-
policy’ ones are in trouble, they cannot be ignored. But such cases should be left to be handled by those
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the Korean case, is to encourage and intervene in debt restructuring negotiations.
However, this process has been ad hoc and ex post and often entailed conversion of
private debt into public debt with little loss-sharing. A more fundamental reform is
introduction of collective-action clauses in sovereign bond contracts and formation of
the creditor clubs for bank loans so that in the event of a crisis a quick rescheduling can
take place. This may increase the borrowing cost by forestalling the exit option for the
creditors, but the certainty of orderly rescheduling may also be attractive to the creditors.
Such arrangements would serve well for the purposes of crisis prevention and crisis
resolution, but it would be difficult for developing countries to institute them on their
own. An active role by the Fund and the support of the G-7 countries would be
necessary. The most radical proposal for bailing-in the private sector calls for creation
of an international bankruptcy court whereby an orderly debt workout can take place
under a debt stand-still (Sachs, 1995; UNCTAD, 1998). Radical as it is, this idea has
many difficulties. The court should be able to come to a quick decision on debt stand-
still based on pre-set criteria. Enforcement of debt workout programs can also pose
great difficulties (Rogoff, 1999). However, such difficulties should not prevent us from
studying this idea further.
Development Crisis and the Bank
Unlike the acute financial crises in the emerging economies, the chronic development
crisis has failed to elicit any bold proposals. Politicians give frequent lip service to the
urgent human needs to eradicate the abject poverty facing a third of the human
population, but there is little action on the ground. The Bretton Woods institutions, too,
have not come up with any bold action plans to fight the development crisis.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
governments that have strategic interests in the troubled countries rather than by the IMF.
33
The fact of the matter is that the Bretton Woods institutions lacked a coherent
strategy for development from the beginning till today. The first sign of this was the
failure to introduce a scheme to stabilize commodity prices despite the fact that large
fluctuations in commodity prices had been a key source of difficulties in managing
developing country economies.26 Second, there was initially no plan for orderly and
adequate capital flows, not to mention transfer of technology, to the developing
countries. The Bank took this up later, but only on a limited scale and scope. Third, the
difficult question of how to promote the political and institutional changes necessary for
sustainable development without compromising sovereignty was never faced squarely.
Instead, it was left to be molded in practice by the financially powerful.
Since the 1980s the Washington Consensus came to represent the development
strategy promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions. However, it was not a genuine
global strategy for development as the Bretton Woods institutions frequently failed to
add up the consequences of their actions in individual countries, producing a fallacy of
composition (Stewart and FitzGerald, 1997). A classic example was provided by the
episode of falling commodity prices in the 1980s, when the Bretton Woods institutions
told the individual countries that had balance-of-payment difficulties as a consequence
of falling commodity prices that they must encourage commodity production and export,
precipitating further declines in commodity prices. Moreover, as we already saw, the
Washington Consensus failed to generate sustained growth in most poor countries, often
exacerbated income distribution and paid little attention to policy sustainability.
It is true that the Bretton Woods institutions have gradually shifted their
emphases and objectives. They now pay greater attention to the distributional impact of
                                                                
26 The IMF responded to this problem by creating Compensatory Financing Facility, but it is not an ex
ante but ex post measure available only after a fall in commodity prices created balance-of-payments
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their programs and, in the case of the Bank, the environmental consequences. There has
also been some change in the underlying economics and consequently the policy stance
of the Bretton Woods institutions. They now recognize the importance of some public
interventions such as prudential regulation of financial institutions and establishment of
social safety net. The need to provide supporting revenues is also now recognized. The
Fund no longer maintains the doctrine that higher interest rate stimulates saving and
therefore growth. There has also been realization that controls on external capital
movements can help contain financial fragility. The World Bank is now developing
Comprehensive Development Framework that purports to seek “broader goals” with
“more instruments.”27
However, there remain doubts about the degree to which the Fund position has
changed. Its programs for the Asian countries – Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea -
in 1997 were heavily criticized for requiring fiscal tightening where no chronic deficit
problem exists, imposing a high interest rate policy where it could cause serious
damages owing to the high leverage ratio of firms, and demanding all-out capital market
liberalization where earlier liberalization was an important cause of the crisis.28 The
Bank has certainly changed a great deal in terms of its rhetoric, but there has so far been
little noticeable change in its country operations and in its capacity to accommodate
dissenting views.
In any case, a move from the Washington Consensus to Comprehensive
Development Framework is not enough. A truly global approach is necessary. For this,
the Bank should become a staunch advocate of a system of international trade and
                                                                                                                                                                                             
difficulties.
27 See Wolfensohn (1999) and Stiglitz (1998) for elaboration of this idea.
28 They did, however, emphasize strengthening of financial supervision and social safety net from the
outset, and the Fund relented on fiscal and monetary tightening as the economies went into severe
recession.
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finance that is supportive of rapid growth in poor countries and allows a degree of
freedom in choosing development strategy. This will include commodity price
stabilization as well as the reform of international finance discussed above. As far as
efforts to bring about internal changes in developing countries, there has to be a
fundamental break away from “We know what is good for you” attitude to extending
helping hands to domestic forces of change. The Bank should stop trying to teach good
economics and micro-manage the economies through conditionality. It should instead
give real help in the field in terms of real resources and technical assistance.
The legacy of past mistakes in the form of hopeless indebtedness by poor
countries must be cleared up, too. Recently, there was some progress in the HIPC
initiative with the rich countries agreeing on how to finance a plan to write off $100
billion of debt owed by the world’s poorest countries.29 However, progress in
implementation is slow. This gradualist approach only serves to prolong the debt
overhang in the poor countries and the bankrupt policy of trying to induce policy reform
with loans as a leverage. It is time to put an end to the indebtedness problem by a one-
shot write-off. Then, the Fund should get out of the business of providing long-term
development loans, and the Bank should take the primary responsibility to tackle the
development crisis.
What should be the main activities of the Bank? Obviously, the Bank must
concentrate its efforts on the poor IDA countries, and its aid should clearly be focused
on providing public goods in which private capital shows little interest. The best way in
which the Bank could help poor countries develop is to contribute to investment in
health, education, environmental protection and technology transfer. Infrastructure
                                                                
29 The real value of the debt write-off, even if it comes into fruition, would be a fraction of this amount
given that many of these countries are simply unable to repay the debt.
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should be financed by private capital as much as possible, and only critically important
but privately non-fundable projects must be considered for the Bank’s support. For
these projects, instead of formal conditionality, heavy presence of the Bank staff in the
recipient countries must be the primary means of ensuring quality management.
In carrying out these projects, the Bank should make fewer loans and more
grants. Loans can be useful for ‘good policy’ countries in supporting social investment,
but loans to ‘poor policy’ countries may end up creating debt problems without doing
much good. In the beginning, the rationale for the Bank activities was the imperfections
in the capital market that denied developing countries access to foreign capital.
However, the capital market has developed greatly since then and there is no reason
why good investment projects cannot be financed by private capital. It is true that poor
developing countries are still by and large shut off from private capital inflows despite
the growth of the capital market. But this is mostly because the economic and political
conditions in these countries are such that what could be potentially good projects are
not in fact commercially sensible. Given this situation, it has become less compelling to
justify the Bank activities in terms of correcting capital market failures.
Recently, under the leadership of the President James Wolfensohn, the Bank
declared its intention to transform itself from a ‘loan bank’ to a ‘knowledge bank’.
Knowledge being a public good, it is argued, the Bank can contribute to international
development by producing and disseminating knowledge on development policies. Its
loan operations will also be improved if this knowledge is used to identify good projects
and programs. This ‘knowledge bank’ view contrasts with the ‘conditionality bank’
view that the Bank can lend profitably to projects and programs that private capital
cannot because its ability to enforce conditionality raises prospects of repayment and
returns on investment (Gilbert et al, 1999). Both views see making loans as the key
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activity of the Bank, and differ only in terms of what other activities, imposing
conditionality and monitoring or producing and applying development knowledge,
enable the Bank to do better than the private lending institutions. Such an interpretation
of the ‘knowledge bank’ does not go far enough. The Bank should not see itself as a
bank with a mission of making loans to what it deems would be commercially sensible
had the capital market been perfect. Instead, it should redefine its role as development
agency. Instead of offering mere policy advice, the Bank should put on field
‘development soldiers’ with skills, expertise and dedication while maximizing hiring of
the local people.
The Bank-Fund Relations
Starting in the mid-1970s and more earnestly in the 1980s, the Fund and the Bank came
to have a large degree of overlap in their activities. The 1966 guidelines for Fund-Bank
collaboration had demarcated areas of primary responsibility for each institution:
macroeconomic issues such as exchange rates, balance of payments and stabilization for
the Fund and development programs and project evaluation for the Bank. But the
increasing overlap of their activities created two major concerns - the possibility of
conflict between the two institutions and the possibility of each institution losing focus
on its core mission.
By and large, collaboration rather than conflict prevailed between the Fund and
the Bank for three reasons.30 First, there was pressure from the rich countries on the
                                                                
30 See Junquito (1996) for a review of the Fund-Bank collaboration. The most celebrated case of overt
conflict between the Fund and the Bank was the Argentina fiasco in 1988, when the Bank decided to go
ahead with adjustment lending despite the collapse of EEF negotiations with the Fund. It led to the Bank-
Fund Concordat of 1989, which superseded the earlier guidelines and elaborated procedures to enhance
coordination between the two institutions (Ahluwalia, 1999). More recently, in handling the Asian
Financial Crisis, the Bank expressed its disagreement with the Fund’s policies such as bank closure, fiscal
restraint and raising the interest rate.
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administrations of the two institutions to collaborate more effectively (Junquito, 1996).
Second, the Fund was in the driving seat, with its adjustment program being taken by
the market as the seal of approval. 31 Third, as already discussed, the two institutions
converged greatly in their policy views.
But this is no cause for celebration. Collaboration and coordination to enhance
the effectiveness of the overlapping and interconnected work is one thing. Suppression
of the differences of opinion and healthy debates is another. We know that in matters of
economic policy consensus is rare. Pretending there is a consensus while there is not
precludes possibilities of correcting erroneous policies and undermines legitimacy of
programs. The Bretton Woods institutions need to discard the bureaucratic instinct for
maintaining the same voice in favor of freer discussions on controversial issues.
This does not, however, mean that they should continue the trend of
convergence in their activities.32 There is a need for a shaper division of labor, with the
Fund focusing on short-term and systemic problems of the international finance and the
Bank on long-term development needs of poor countries. Since the former issues are
immediately connected to the interests of the rich and powerful countries while the
latter is not, the scarce Bank resources and activities can easily be diverted away from
where they must focus. It is worrisome that the Bank has approved the Emergency
Structural Adjustment Lending procedure that enables the Bank to provide direct
financing to supplement Fund financing at times of crisis. The Bank should resist the
role of providing extra funds for the IMF rescue financing. Instead, its resources and
                                                                
31 The Bank’s SALs were expected to be used in cases where a Fund program was already in place, and
the Fund staff usually had the final say in the Fund-Bank joint-preparation of the Policy Framework
Papers for SAF and ESAF programs.
32 The increasing overlap in the activities of the Fund and the Bank prompted some to suggest a merger as
a way of avoiding duplication of work and conflicting advice (Crook, 1991). But the recent crises show
that the Fund must pay increasing attention to the short-term market factors and the systemic issues. This
implies greater distinctiveness in the Fund’s role from that of the Bank (Ahluwalia, 1999).
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capacities must be deployed to confront the other crisis of the neo-liberal era, the
chronic development crisis.
A sharper division of labor between the Fund and the Bank does not remove
the need for collaboration between them. For instance, their collaboration in
strengthening financial systems through the newly created Financial Sector Liaison
Committee is perfectly desirable. The Bank has also played useful roles in crisis
management by emphasizing the social aspects of adjustment and providing technical
assistance for financial restructuring. It is making efforts to promote better policy
responses to the social consequences of financial crises (World Bank, 1999b).
Strengthening social policy is now considered an integral part of the new financial
system.
Conclusion: The Bretton Woods Institutions for the 21st Century
Reforming the Bretton Woods institutions is an important part of designing the
governance of the world economy in the 21st century. Based on historical and
institutional analyses, this paper has suggested the following reform measures. First,
measures for institutional reform include
1. Reforming the voting system to give greater voice to developing countries
2. Enhancing transparency and accountability
3. Radically downsizing or eliminating conditionality
4. Decentralization of research and decision-making.
Changes in the roles and policies of the Fund should include
1.  Contributing to strengthening national financial systems
2.  Encouraging measures to curb excessive inflows of short-term capital
3.  Macroeconomic policy coordination and exchange rate stabilization
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4.  Discontinuing long-term lending and focusing on the lender of last resort
function
5.  Developing a mechanism for orderly debt workout.
New roles suggested for the Bank include
1. Advocating global economic governance conducive to development of poor
countries
2. Giving up attempts to micro-manage recipient economies
3. Focusing on provision of public goods in poor countries
4. Shifting away from loans toward grants.
In addition, a shaper division of labor, with the Fund focusing on short-term and
systemic problems of the international finance and the Bank on long-term development
needs of poor countries, has been recommended.
These are tall orders, and there are many technical details that have to be
elaborated. In devising a practical reform strategy, it is also necessary to consider
political constraints. Any realistic reform proposal must come out of a process in which
the advanced countries are fully engaged and developing country concerns are well
represented. In order to get developing countries involved with the discussion on the
new international financial architecture, the US government created G-22, which was
expanded later into G-33 and then succeeded by G-20. Rather than this kind of ad hoc
consultation, there is a need for an institutionalized forum for forming a consensus on
the governance of global finance and development.
In order to maximize the chances for a real reform, we have to maximize the
forces in favor of reform. Both the “voice” mechanism and the “exit” mechanism must
be utilized. The voice mechanism must be strengthened by a more effective formation
of common ground among the developing countries. They may also draw on the support
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of the NGO community on some issues, as in the example of the Jubilee 2000
movement and Tobin Tax movement. The “exit” mechanism here does not mean the
option of closing the economy and withdrawing from the world market. It means the
existence of alternative official sources of support for funding and technical assistance
for developing countries when the private capital market is effectively beyond reach.
The Bretton Woods institutions have been so powerful and resistant to reform,
precisely because of the monopoly position they hold in this regard. There is a need for
competitive pressure on these institutions. Subjecting much of their research to open
competition may be a good way to increase the competitive pressure (Mellor, 1996). A
more significant step would be to design a network of regional and sub-regional
organizations, including the regional and sub-regional development banks and reserve
funds, to support the management of monetary and financial issues (UN, 1999). This
would not only play a useful role in itself in both crisis management and development
financing, but also bring competitive pressure on the Washington-based Bretton Woods
institutions to improve their performance. A starting point for this road would be
establishment of the AMF, support for which must now be stronger than when it was
first proposed.
A related issue is whether it is better for global financial governance to have
consolidated institutional framework, i.e. the Bretton Woods institutions with enhanced
powers, or to have a multiplicity of institutions with overlapping and competing
jurisdictions. Indeed, there are calls for creation of new institutions such as a global
financial regulator, an international bankruptcy court and an international deposit
insurance system. From the perspective of using competitive pressure to discipline the
powerful institutions, such proposals should be considered favorably even at the risk of
duplicating similar functions. After all, all of these institutions co-exist along with a
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lender of last resort in domestic financial systems. Just as the national financial markets
came to acquire a measure of stability after the establishment of banking and securities
regulations, deposit insurance and lenders of last resort, stabilizing today’s globalized
financial markets will require similar functions at the global level. And it is preferable
to have alternative institutions available than to have a single super agency. This is not
to say that it is unimportant to strengthen the roles and functions of the Bretton Woods
institutions in ways that can best meet the challenges of the next century.
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